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Pennsylvania now finds itself in a very anomalous position, in that if the
mother of an illegitimate child is considered a fit person for custody, the
putative father cannot visit the child. If the possibility exists that the
welfare of the child might be enhanced by granting the putative father
visitation privileges, that possibility is now relegated to a minor status.
This is certainly not within the trend of decisions that other courts have
followed 23 but rather is a minority position.
Majority jurisdictions, when faced with this issue, will tend to take the
view that a great deal of thought should be given to the trial court's discretion as to the disposition of visitation privileges by the putative father,
in that only there can it be detected whether this illegitimate child would
be benefited or harmed by such visitation privileges.
Lawrence Gabriele
23

See supra notes 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, and 18.

REAL PROPERTY-TAXATION-LEASE OF EXEMPT
PROPERTY TO PRIVATE PARTIES
The Illinois State Toll Highway Commission leased to Standard Oil
Company certain sites along the toll road for use as restaurants and gasoline stations. The county where the property is located assessed a tax on
the Standard Oil leaseholds, on the basis of Section 26 of the Illinois Revenue Act' which provides that when tax exempt real estate is leased to one
not entitled to an exemption, the leasehold estate and the property attached
to it are considered to be real estate of the lessee. 2 The Highway Commission
commenced an action to enjoin the assessment, arguing that since the lease
provided for a reduction in the rent by such a tax, the burden of the3
assessment would fall upon the Commission which is a tax-exempt body.
The trial court accepted the Commission's argument, and entered a decree
enjoining the assessment. The county appealed urging that there are many
decisions holding that land which is leased to private parties by tax exempt
entities is taxable under Section 26, and that in the light of such decisions,
the legislature showed an intention to assess such property by not amending Section 26 specifically to exempt such leaseholds. The Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the decree of the trial court on the basis that the legislature
intended Section 18 of the Toll Highway Act, 4 which exempts all propIll. Revenue Act § 26, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 507 (1963).
2 Ibid.
3 Toll Highways Act § 18, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121, § 314 (1963).
4 Ibid.
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erty belonging to the Commission, to exempt the type of leasehold in

question. Illinois State Toll Highway Commission v. Korzen, 32 Ill. 2d
338, 205 N.E.2d 433 (1965).
This case illustrates, for the first time in Illinois, the tax consequences

of a state leasing property to a private party to be used for a public purpose. The Illinois Supreme Court declared that the issue in the case was
whether the legislature intended Section 18 of the Toll Highway Act to
exempt such leaseholds from taxation, or whether the legislature's failure
specifically to exempt such leaseholds showed an intent that the leaseholds
should be assessed under Section 26 of the Revenue Act. In order to evaluate the court's interpretation of the statutes involved, as applied to this
unusual fact situation, it is necessary to delve into the history of the
court's stand on tax exemptions, analyze the decisions in analogous cases,
and examine the view that other states have taken in similar circumstances.
According to the Constitution of the State of Illinois, the object of
taxation is "to provide such revenue as may be needful."5 In the spirit of
the theory that every person shall bear equally the burden of the cost of
government, the constitution provides that taxes are to be levied in such
a manner "that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion
to the value of his, her or its property."" In the light of these constitutional
provisions and similar provisions in the other state constitutions, exemptions from taxation are not favored in Illinois or any other jurisdiction.
An alleged constitutional or statutory grant of exemption from taxation
will be strictly construed in favor of taxation and against the taxpayer
and the exemption. In Illinois, and at least nine other jurisdictions, it has
been held that all cases of doubt as to the legislative intention, or as to
the inclusion of particular property within the terms of the statute, will
be resolved against the claimed exemption. 7 Such a privilege of immunity
cannot be made out by inference or implication, but must be "plainly and
unmistakenly" granted. 8 The court, in People ex. rel. Gill v. Trustees of
Schools,9 revealed the logic behind the strict construction policy towards
exemptions as follows:
If the courts permit, by illogical interpretation of the constitutional provision exempting property, a liberal rather than a limited construction of the
statute passed under it, and thereby enlarge the field of exempt property, a
substantial injury is inflicted upon other property owners by diminishing the

S 1.
61d. at S3.
TPeople ex. rel. Marsters v. Rev. Saleyni Missionaries, 409 Ill. 376, 99 N.E.2d 186
5 ILL. CONST. art. 9,
(1951).

sPeople ex. rel. Gill v. Lake Forest University, 367 Ill. 103, 106, 10 N.E.2d 667, 669
(1937).
9 364 Ill. 131, 4 N.E.2d 16 (1936).
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amount of property which carries the expense of government rather than
distributing such charge equally so far as practicable.' °
The Illinois constitution provides that the "property of the state, counties, and other municipal corporations, both real and personal, and such
other property as may be used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes,
may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption shall be only by
general law."" By statute, Illinois exempts from taxation all property of
every kind belonging to the state of Illinois 12 and municipal property used
for municipal or public purposes. 13 The Commission cited the almost
identical language used by the legislature in granting the analogous tax
exemptions given to the state and to the Commission 14 and argued that
for that reason, the Commission was entitled to as broad an interpretation
of the Commission's statutory grant of exemption as the court had given
to the state's statutory grant of exemption. The court, however, has never
considered the scope of the state's statutory grant of exemption in the
light of an exact or similar fact situation. Wherever the case involved a
lease by the state to a private party, the property was used for a purely
private purpose. In all these cases, the court ruled against the claimed
exemption. 15 In considering other claims for exemptions, such as municipal, charitable or educational institutions, the court has consistently held
that a lease to a private party to be used for private purposes was not
exempt.' 6 Even where the proceeds from said lease were used exclusively
to promote the exempted entity, the court has refused to allow an exemption. 17 There are, however, cases wherein such institutions themselves have
employed the property in a private manner and retained the tax exemp8
tion. In all these cases, the court has applied the "primary use" doctrine.'
10 ld. at 135, 4 N.E.2d at 18.
11 ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 3.
12 111. Revenue Act, ILL. REv.
13 Id. at S 500.6.

STAT.

ch. 120, § 500.5 (1963).
14

Supra notes 3, 12.

15 La Salle County Mfg. Co. v. City of Ottawa, 16 111.418 (1855); Carrington v. People,
195 111. 484, 63 N.E. 163 (1902).

16 City of Chicago v. University of ChicaLgo, 302 Ill. 455, 134 N.E. 723 (1922); People
ex. rel. Marsters v. Rev. Saleyni Missionaries, supra note 7; Turnverin "Lincoln" v.
Bd. of Appeals of Cook County, 358 Ill. 135, 192 N.E. 780 (1934); People v. International
Salt Co. of Ill., 233 I11.223, 84 N.E. 278 (1908); People ex. rel. Paschen v. Hendrickson
Pontiac, 9 Ill. 250, 137 N.E.2d 381 (1956).
17 City of Chicago v. Ames, 365 Ill. 529, 7 N.E.2d 294 (1937); People ex. rel. Gill v.
Trustees of Schools, 364 I11.131, 4 N.E.2d 16 (1936); People v. Chicago Theological
Seminary, 174 111. 177, 51 N.E. 198 (1898).
8
People v. Freeport Masonic Temple, 347 I11.180, 179 N.E. 672 (1931); People
ex. rel. Gill v. Lake Forest University, 367 Ill. 103, 10 N.E.2d 667 (1937); People v.
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In People ex. rel. Goodman v. University of Illinois Foundation, the primary use doctrine was defined in the following manner:
Where the principal and primary purpose to which property is employed is

for a public educational, charitable, municipal or other exempt purpose, the
mere fact that income is incidentally ... derived from its use for a nonexempt
purpose does not necessarily render the property taxable. 19

In all cases where the primary use argument was applied successfully in
retaining the exemption, the private use was by the same institution which
qualified for the exemption originally, but was never by a private party
who had leased the property. 20 There have been several notable cases involving municipalities. In Sanitary District of Chicago v. Young, 21 and in
People v. Sanitary District of Chicago,22 the municipality had employed
the sanitary canal to produce electricity which it proceeded to sell to the
public. In both instances the Sanitary District claimed a tax exemption
for the property upon which the enterprise was carried on under the
application of the primary use doctrine. In both instances, the court ruled
that the property used for the production of electricity was not exempt.
In the case of the City of Mattoon v. Graham,23 the court was confronted
with the situation of municipality leasing out property under which was
situated a subterranean lake from which the municipality drew its water.
The court stated that:
[W]here a tract is used for two purposes or "double purposes" one of which
would exempt it from taxation and the other not, it is permissible to assess

against the part of the property devoted to a use not exempt from
and levy2tax
4
taxation.
The state attempted to apply the primary use doctrine to the facts at hand.
Excluding the cases involving the municipalities, previous decisions dealing with the application of the primary use doctrine would support an
exemption only if the Commission itself operated the restaurants and
gasoline stations. At any rate, in the instant case, 25 the Commission itself
was not assessed, but the lessee was assessed under authority of Section 26.
The Commission had entered the case on behalf of the lessee because of a
Y.M.C.A. of Chicago, 365 111.118, 6 N.E.2d 166 (1936); Krause v. Peoria Housing
Authority, 370 IIL 356, 19 N.E.2d 193 (1939); People ex. rel. Goodman v. University
of Illinois Foundation, 388 I1l. 363, 58 N.E.2d 33 (1944).
19 People ex rel. Goodman v. University of Illinois Foundation, supra note 18 at 371,
58 N.E.2d at 37.
22 307 Ill. 24, 138 N.E. 209 (1923).
2OSupra note 17.
23 386 111. 180, 53 N.E.2d 955 (1944).
21285 111. 351, 120 N.E. 818 (1918).
24 Id. at 181, 53 N.E.2d at 958.
25 State Toll Highway Commission v. Korzen, 32 I11.2d 338, 205 N.E.2d 433 (1965).
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provision in the lease which reduced the rent paid by the lessee to the
Commission by the amount of any ad valorem tax assessed on the lessee.
Therefore, the Commission contended, any tax assessed on the lessee was
in reality assessed on the Commission. As the county correctly retorted,
this provision in the lease agreement was purely a business judgment on the
part of the makers in no way affecting the status of the lessee with respect
to its tax liability.
It is clear that the property would have remained exempt had the
Commission operated the facilities itself instead of leasing them. Yet, the
property is still being used for the primary purpose with respect to the
general public. It is being used in the same manner as the act envisioned,
and as the Commission itself would have used the property. The question
arises as to why it should not remain exempt. The property is bestowing
a benefit upon the public and, as such, the use is public. However, with
respect to the lessee, the property is serving primarily a private use. The
lessee's primary motive is to make a profit. The lessee in achieving his
objective must necessarily compete with other service facilities located
off the toll road. Besides having the obvious advantage of being the only
services available on the toll road, the lessee seeks the added advantage of
an exemption from taxes which his competitors are required to pay merely
because his activity benefits the public. The fact that the use of the property is in the public interest or for the public benefit does not necessarily
mean that the use is a public use. Where representatives of a "civic league"
purchasing land for a city park with money raised by private subscriptions
took title in their own name, the land was not exempt from taxation, even
26
though the owners were willing to deed it to the city immediately. In
that case, there was no profit motive whatever, yet, the property was taxed.
Section 26 makes the lessee of exempt property the owner of such
property for the purpose of assessing taxes. Section 26 does not look into
the use of the land to determine its character, but looks merely to the user.
Here, the lessee was a private party whose own property was not exempt.
By all previous Illinois authority, the leasehold was not exempt.2 7 Both the
traditional policy of the court towards statutory grants of exemption and
specific decisions of the court involving the application of Section 26 were
against the granting of an exemption in this case. However, the court, in
adopting the argument put forth by the Commission, was in keeping with
the new trend established by recent decisions in several jurisdictions which
have also considered the problem of dual-aspect leases of exempt property.
The Commission cites a New Jersey case 28 involving almost identical
2

0People v. City of Toulon, 300 Ill. 408, 133 NE. 707 (1921).
27 Supra note 14.
28
WaIter Reade, Inc. v. Township of Dennis, 36 N.J. 435, 177 A.2d 752 (1962).
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facts as authority for a decision granting an exemption. The only significant distinction between the two fact situations was the language employed in the statutes granting the exemptions to the respective commissions. The New Jersey Toll Highway Act was more specific in describing the scope of the grant. The statute provided as follows:
The Authority shall not be required to pay any taxes or assessments upon
any project or any property acquired or used by the Authority under the
provisions of this act or upon the income therefrom, and every project and
any property acquired or used by the Authority under the provisions of this
29
act and the income therefrom ...

shall be exempt from taxation.

This statute, although it doesn't specifically exempt leasehold interests
from taxation, does embody in its language a more express intent to exempt
such leaseholds than the general, vague exemption created by the Illinois
statute.
Ohio has passed a Toll Highway Act3 ° exempting "all property" belonging to said Toll Highway Commission which could conceivably conflict with a constitutional provision authorizing exemptions for public
property used exclusively for any public purposeY1 Although there are
no decisions as of yet, one commentator discusses the hypothetical problem of the tax status of "oases" and comes up with four possible solutions,
namely,
1) Concessions could indicate a non-exclusive use of the property . . .thus

denying the exemption....
2) . . .Service station-restaurant property could be classified as entities sep-

arate from the roadbed; therefore, an exemption allowance could be made for
all property except the actual plats leased to the service stations and restaurants.
3) Service stations could be considered necessities and thus exempt ... while

the restaurants might be held taxable, either because they are not necessities
or because they house strictly profit making souvenir shops. ...
4) . . .these concessions could be considered incidental and necessary
to the operation of the turnpike and therefore carry the exemption along
with it.32

The author emphasizes that any decision of the court would be based
upon the court's interpretation of the word "exclusively" as it is used in
the constitutional restriction on granting exemptions. He further states
that "[t]he trend in public property cases seems to be that there must
be an exclusive public use, whose main objective is a public purpose, and
not merely public benefit, convenience or welfare." 33 This statement
29 N.J. STAT. ANN., ch. 16 §27:12B-16 (1952).
30 OHIO REv. CODE, §5537.20 (1953).
31 OHIO CONST. art XII, §2.
32 Note, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 344 (1953).

33 Ibid.
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would indicate that the "oases" are merely a public benefit, convenience
or welfare not meriting an exemption.
Decisions in several jurisdictions which involved the status of property
serving a dual purpose, public-private, turned upon the presence or absence of public regulation of the activity. The decisive issue in these
cases was the necessity of public control of privately operated parking
facilities to ensure their devotion to a public use and thus to justify the
exercise of eminent domain, expenditure of public funds, or the granting
of a tax exemption. A Massachusetts case involved the granting of a tax
exemption.8 4 A statute was passed authorizing the city of Boston to lease
property for the construction and operation of a garage to ease the public
nuisance of traffic congestion. The leasehold was made exempt by a special
amendment to the statute. Operators of private garages in the city brought
an action to force the city to assess taxes against the lessees of the municipal garage. It was contended that the operators of the municipal garage
should not be exempted because the operators of private garages which
compete with the municipal garage were assessed, and the garage is not a
public use since it is not regulated and controlled by the city. The independent operators claimed that it was necessary for the city to control the
rates to be charged and the quality of service to be rendered by such a
privately operated parking facility to ensure its devotion to a public use.
The Massachusetts court allowed the exemption to stand, stating that "the
absence of regulation had no tendency to indicate that the garage scheme
was for other than a public purpose. 35 Both a California case 36 and an
Indiana case 37 involved the exercise of the power of eminent domain by
the municipalities.
The California court decided that the acquisition of land by the city
to be leased to private individuals to construct a parking garage without
the city retaining power to control rates and quality of service was not
a proper exercise by the city of its constitutional power of eminent domain
because it was for a private and not a public use. 38 Under similar circumstances the Indiana court said it was necessary for the statute authorizing
the lease of property to private parties to grant power to the city to control rates and quality of service in order for the lease of property obtained
39
through the power of eminent domain to be constitutional.
Although the Massachusetts, California, and Indiana cases do not involve fact situations analogous to the case in point, they are all acutely
34 Cabot v. Assessors of Boston, 335 Mass. 53, 138 N.E. 2d 618 (1956).
35 Id. at 67, 138 N.E.2d at 627.
36 City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955).
37 Folty v. City of Indianapolis, 234 Ind. 656, 130 N.E. 2d 650 (1955).
38 Supra note 36.

30

Supra note 37.
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concerned with the problem of dual aspect uses of public property leased
to private individuals. It would appear from the facts and decisions of
these cases, that, if faced with the tax problem created by the "oases,"
California and Indiana would not favor an exemption, while Massachusetts
would allow the exemption to stand. As noted earlier, Ohio would probably continue strictly to construe the "exclusive" requirement of its constitution 40 and disallow an exemption. New Jersey, on the other hand, under
almost identical circumstances, approved of the exemption. The only other
jurisdiction to have considered the problem of dual aspect uses was New
York, which, through a liberal application of the primary use doctrine,
has approved of such an exemption. 41 Without any decisions to indicate
otherwise, it must be presumed that remaining jurisdictions continue to
construe constitutional and statutory grants of exemption against the party
to be taxed and the exemption. Illinois, in following the view of the
Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey courts, represents the new
trend. The real purpose behind this new trend is not merely the recognition of supremacy of the primary use doctrine based on the benefit
bestowed upon the public but, more importantly, a recognition of the
expanding use of publicly-owned property in a proprietary manner to
serve public ends. In discussing a New York case which had supported
an exemption in a dual aspect situation, one commentator stated that:
[T]he tone of the case indicates the court is attempting to ease the restric-

42
tions on incidental use of state property for a private purpose.
As more jurisdictions are confronted with this still novel problem of dual
aspect leases, they will begin to adopt the view of the Illinois court. It is
inevitable that, as the scope and functions of city and state government
expand to meet the increasingly complex problems of industrialization and
urbanization, the courts will be confronted with many more cases involving the dual aspect use of public property.

Bruce Rasbkow
4oSupra note 31.
41 State Insurance Fund v. Hamblin, 31 Misc. 2d 977, 222 N.Y.2d 732 (1961).
42 Note, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 617 (1962).

SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-BLOOD RECEIVED
FROM A BLOOD BANK
Plaintiff's wife entered St. Mary's Hospital for treatment of an ailment.
While being treated, she required several blood transfusions which were
administered by the hospital using whole blood supplied by the defendant

